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The appointment of politicians to the boards of directors of companies remains a highly used 
corporate strategy nowadays. However, the empirical studies carried out so far remain 
inconclusive on whether, and to what extent, these appointments create or destroy value for 
companies. Based on the resource dependency theory, we argue that it is likely that the ability 
of appointed politicians to bring valuable resources to companies will be related to the human 
and social capital of these politicians. This dissertation aims to assess the veracity of this 
statement through the value that investors attribute to each appointment. The forecasts were 
tested in the Portuguese context, through the study of a group of 44 EuroNext Lisbon Stock 
companies, between 2010 and 2018, in which 334 director appointments were registered. Our 
results not only demonstrate that hiring politicians are considered beneficial by investors in 
Portugal but also suggest that there is a negative relationship between the number of political 
positions that each politician held and the reactions of investors to his appointment. This 
adverse reaction can be explained by several factors, such as the preference of investors for 
specialist directors instead of generalists, or the distrust of frequent changes in position by 
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A nomeação de políticos para os conselhos de administração de empresas continua a ser uma 
estratégia corporativa altamente utilizada nos dias de hoje. Contudo, os estudos empíricos 
realizados até ao momento continuam inconclusivos sobre se e em que medida estas nomeações 
criam ou destroem valor às empresas. Com base na teoria de dependência de recursos 
argumentamos que é provável que a capacidade dos políticos apontados trazerem recursos 
valiosos para as empresas, esteja relacionada com o capital social e humano desses políticos.  
Esta tese tem como objetivo avaliar a veracidade desta premissa através do valor que os 
investidores atribuem a cada nomeação. As previsões foram testadas dentro do contexto 
português, através do estudo de um conjunto de 44 empresas da EuroNext Lisbon Stock, entre 
o período de 2010 e 2018, no qual foram registadas 334 nomeações. Os nossos resultados não 
só demonstram que a contratação de políticos é considerada benéfica pelos investidores em 
Portugal, como sugerem ainda que existe uma relação negativa entre o número de posições 
políticas que cada político ocupou e as reações dos investidores à sua nomeação. Esta reação 
negativa pode ser explicada através de vários fatores, como a preferência dos investidores por 
diretores especialistas em vez de generalistas, ou pela desconfiança das frequentes mudanças 
de posição por parte dos investidores, ou ainda pelo Índice de Corrupção que Portugal 
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According to resource dependence theory, corporations operate in an open system, 
dependent on external players, such as competitors and governments (Hillman, 2005). The 
government policies and regulations have a significant impact on the firm’s performance 
(Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Boddewyn, 1988), which increases their level of interdependence 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and consequently generates uncertainty among many firms 
(Selznick, 1949). To reduce this dependence, it is crucial for organizations to build political 
strategies (Baron, 1995) that create bridges with the government (Selznick, 1949; Pfeffer, 
1972), in order to reach beneficial public policies for the firm’s survival (Abelson & Baysinger, 
1984; Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi & Cannella, 2008). The appointment of politicians to 
corporate boards is one of the most common strategies to develop this political approach 
(Hillman & Hitt, 1999).  
Several scholars have described the appointment of politicians over time and tried to 
theorize the reasons, and the pros and cons of this strategy (Hillman and Hit, 1999; Govekar, 
1990; Pfeffer, 1972; Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989). However, there is still a disagreement 
inside the corporate political activity studies on how investors evaluate those appointments as 
value-adding (Faccio, 2006). Therefore, instead of analyzing if politicians add or not value to 
the companies, this dissertation aims to understand the characteristics of human and social 
capital that investors value the most in former politicians that are appointed to the firms’ board 
of directors. We intend to understand the real value of the politicians’ appointment to investors 
by attributing the specific benefits of the resource provision to the breadth, depth, and 
deterioration of human and social capital (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi 
& Cannella, 2008).  
According to the corporate governance literature, directors on corporate boards serve for 
two purposes. The first one is the governance role, since the directors are responsible for 
ratifying the managers’ decisions and coordinating their implementation (Baysinger & Butler, 
1985). Nevertheless, besides that, they are also responsible for raising resources for 
organizations, such as information, communication with external stakeholders, access to the 
political arena, and legitimacy (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This thesis focuses on this second 
role of directors as resource providers. Specifically, we predict there to be a relationship 
between appointed politicians’ access to resources and the combination of the politicians’ 
human and social capital.  
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Following the resource dependence perspective (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), we expect 
that our empirical findings show a positive reaction by the investors to politicians’ appointment, 
in the sense that the resources they provide are useful and needed by the organization (El Nayal, 
Oosterhout & Essen, 2019). Therefore, we believe that the higher the breadth (the number of 
years of experience), and the depth (the number of different positions held by former 
politicians) (Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi & Cannella, 2008), the higher the director’s success in 
the resources’ pursuit and, consequently, the higher the value the director brings to the 
company. On the other hand, we consider that the lower the deterioration of a former politician 
(the period between the last position held as a politician and the appointment to the company), 
the higher the value added by him as a director.  
We decided to study this topic because human and social capital has never been related 
to the value that investors attach to the appointment of former politicians. Carrying out this 
study allows us to get out of the usual paradigm of knowing whether or not politicians bring 
value to the company in general, and to understand what are the benefits that they can bring, 
and how they can be related to the social and human capital of each former politician. On the 
other hand, the Portuguese case has never been studied or accounted for in terms of former 
politicians’ appointments, and we think it can be a useful contribution for the area to have 
Portuguese numbers and data. 
In order to test the theoretical model presented, we analyzed 334 director appointments 
made by the 44 companies of the Lisbon Stock Exchange throughout 2010 and 2018. After 
identifying all those directors who have played a political role at different levels of government, 
we obtained a sample of 24 cases, and we developed an event study methodology to perceive 
the investors’ reactions regarding these appointments. By using the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) as the dependent variable in our linear regressions, we discover that investors 
react positively to politician appointments in general, but also that investors have an adverse 
reaction to the appointment of politicians who have greater human and social capital breadth 
(as measured by the number of political positions they have served prior to their appointment 
to the firm). We conclude by arguing that these findings can contribute to the existing corporate 











Market Domain vs. Nonmarket Domain: Government as a Nonmarket Actor 
 
Nowadays, due to the rapid changes in the competitive environment, companies struggle 
daily in a quest to improve their financial performance and consequently consolidate their 
market positions. Strategic management scholars have demonstrated over the last years that it 
is necessary to look both inside and outside of the firm to achieve these results (Baron, 1995). 
The business environment is composed of market and nonmarket elements, and any strategy 
formulation must consider both approaches (Doh, Lawton & Rabjwani, 2012). The market 
domain embraces the relationships between companies and other parties that are intermediated 
by markets and private agreements, such as suppliers, customers, employees, competitors, and 
owners (Porter, 1988). In contrast, firms’ interactions intermediated through stakeholders, 
governments, pressure groups, media, and public institutions are characteristics of the 
nonmarket environment (Baron, 1995). Therefore, companies need to develop both market and 
nonmarket strategies, which are complementary in order to survive in the business market. The 
market strategies are a set of actions taken at a market level in order to create more value for 
the company by analyzing and identifying strengths, weaknesses, new opportunities, and threats 
related to competition (Helms & Nixon, 2010). The nonmarket strategies aim to shape the firm’s 
external environment and make it favorable for them. In that sense, firms engage in social 
actions and develop significant corporate political ties (CPT), to be better to generate more 
valuable resources and capabilities, which can give them a tremendous competitive advantage 
over the remaining rivals (Sun, Mellahi, Wright, 2012).  
The business influence on public policy is a global phenomenon (Hillman, 2004), and 
much research has demonstrated that the government, due to its policy, regulation, and 
enforcement, is the organization that has the most significant influence over firms’ performance 
and profitability (Shaffer, 1995). 
 
Resource Dependence Theory and CPA: a bridge with the government  
The resource dependence theory (RDT), designed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), 
domains the CPA literature (Hillman, 2005) and tries to help us understand the firm’s 
relationships and dynamics with external organizations (Cyril Bouquet & Julian Birkinshaw, 
2008).  According to the resource dependence perspective, firms require a set of resources to 
survive in the business market (Lester, Hillman, Zard Koohi & Cannella, 2008). However, firms 
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are open systems that are dependent and influenced by external actors, making it impossible to 
control all the necessary resources. The external dependence increases the risk and uncertainty 
inside the firms (Pfeffer, 1972), which could seriously affect their performance. In order to 
reduce this uncertainty and gain more control over the business environment, firms need to 
create linkages with essential sources of external dependency (Hillman, 2005).  
As it was mentioned above, the government is still the primary source of external 
dependence for firms (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Schuler, Rehibein, & Cramer, 2002). The effect 
of its legislative power has a significant impact on firms’ competitive positioning and 
performance (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Mahon & Murray, 1981). It can modify the companies’ 
market size (rivals, entrants, substitute products, buyers, and suppliers), establish entry and exit 
barriers, provide favorable subsidies to the firms and change the employment, safety, or 
environmental regulation (Shaffer, 1995). 
Due to all this uncertainty carried out by the government, many industries have been 
developing corporate political strategies, defined as proactive actions (Abelson & Baysinger, 
1984). These strategies serve not only to anticipate changes in public policies but also to play 
an active role in shaping government decisions (Molitor, 2001) in order to create a policy 
environment favorable to them (Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi & Cannella, 2008). More 
specifically, through these mechanisms, firms were able to bolster their economic positions, to 
hinder their competitors’ progress and ability to compete, and to have a voice in government 
affairs (Keim & Zeithaml, 1986; Wood, 1986). Selznick (1949) described this process as a kind 
of government power cooptation, in which firms intended to create linkages with the politicians 
and influential members of the community. In their study, Hillman & Hitt (1999) presented a 
set of possible tactics that companies could adopt, according to the strategies initially defined. 
Among them, the most common are lobbying, contributions to politicians or parties, paid 
travels, grassroots mobilization of employees, suppliers, customers, and the appointment of 
directors with political experience to the board of the companies.   
 
The role of directors on Corporate Boards  
When we refer to the directors on the board of a firm, there are two leading roles that they 
are expected to fulfill: the governance role and the resource-provisionary role (Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003; Hillman, Cannella & Paetzold, 2000).  The governance role of directors is related 
to the regular tasks that a director of a company has to perform in order to serve the interests of 
shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Therefore, it is necessary that a director ensures the 
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excellent management of the company and to ratify and implement the shareholders’ decisions 
(Hillman, Cannella & Paetzold, 2000; El Nayal, Oosterhout & Essen, 2019; Baysinger & Butler, 
1985). For example, it is important for any company to have directors with experience as CEO, 
as they will benefit from their executive knowledge on the board of directors, much more 
focused on the governance role than on the provision of resources. 
On the other hand the resource-provisionary role, directly linked with the RDT, is related 
to the firm’s need of several primary resources and the ability of the board of directors to 
provide and control them, in order to ensure the safety and well-being of the company (Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978). For example, company 1 has a director who is simultaneously on the board 
of directors of company 2 (which controls valuable resources for company 1). It is important 
for company 1 to have him has a director, once he is ensuring the provision of essential 
resources (Johnson, Schnatterly & Hill, 2013). Another example are the companies that operate 
in highly regulated sectors. These companies are much more vulnerable to changes in public 
policies enacted by the state since a simple change in regulation can have significant impacts 
on their performance (Hillman, Wither & Collins, 2009). Thus, it will be necessary for these 
companies to have directors with secure connections to policymakers, capable of influencing 
their decisions on behalf of the company. Or at least, having access to privileged information 
so that the companies can adapt to the new policies in advance. In this sense, directors are 
responsible for advice and counsel, communication and information between the firm and 
external organizations, access to crucial constituents, and legitimacy (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; 
Hillman, 2005; Gales & Kesner, 1994).  
In the board of directors’ literature, many studies have been carried out in order to 
understand what are the factors that determine the motivation and ability of directors to perform 
their roles (S. G. Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 2013). In this study, we believe that politicians 
are appointed to the firms’ boards because of the resource-provisionary role, and not because 
of their governance capabilities and that their ability to bring valuable resources to the 
companies is linked to their human and social capital.  
 
Politicians on the board  
Several RDT authors consider that the use of the board of directors is one of the first 
approaches of absorbing key elements to reduce uncertainty inside the firms (Hillman, Cannella 
& Paetzold, 2000), especially when it comes to managing government dependency (Lester, 
Hillman, Zardkoohi & Cannella, 2008). In general terms, and according to a resource 
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dependence perspective, when a company hires former politicians to their boards, it can expect 
two primary resources brought by them. First of all, these politicians bring with them the ability 
to communicate and exchange information with members of the government (Pfeffer, 1972). 
This resource allows companies to have access to the formulation and application of policies, 
with the advantage of having an element able to pressure the government and that tries to avoid 
policies that harm the company’s well-being (Hadani, Doh, & Scheneider, 2016). Besides, they 
also provide access to key contingents, such as resources controlled by the state, tax 
exemptions, and public contracts that benefit companies (Goldman, Rocholl & So, 2013). 
Second, as we know, government processes are quite complex and challenging to interpret. In 
that sense, former politicians appointed to the board of directors provide an advice and counsel 
service, based on the valuable knowledge of all the rules and mechanisms of the government 
(Hillman, 2005). All these advantages allow companies to acquire information and assistance, 
which would otherwise be impossible or too expensive (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). 
On the other hand, several studies point that in the opposite direction, arguing that hiring 
former politicians is something that can be harmful to companies. Chaney, Faccio & Parsley 
(2011) demonstrated in their paper that hiring former politicians has a very high cost for the 
companies and that in some instances, it can even affect their performance. Hadani & Schuler 
(2012) also found empirical evidence that investment in political activity is negatively 
associated with financial performance. Also, Andonoy, Hochberg & Rauh (2018) added that it 
is not possible to prove that the set of skills held by former politicians is exactly the same 
necessary to monitor and manage a company. In addition to studies that indicate that hiring 
former politicians is positive or negative, some have found non-significant results of CPA on 
firms’ performance (Tihanyi, Aguilera, Heugens, et al., 2019).  
In sum, all these divergent conclusions demonstrate that currently there is no consensus 
on the CPA literature, about the true value of hiring former politicians. Some authors expect 
that the appointments of politicians increase the real value of the company, once they contribute 
to the control and management of essential resources, which reduce external dependence and 
consequently increase the security of the company. On the other hand, others have the idea that 
politicians do not have the necessary skills to manage and monitor a company and may even 
harm the shareholders’ interests. These differences prove that the knowledge inside the CPA 
literature is still not vast and deep enough to answer all questions within this area.  
Since there is still existing uncertainty about the actual value of former politicians on the 
board of directors, instead of focusing on whether hiring former politicians is suitable for the 
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firms or not, we will look at what they are good at, and what benefits they can bring to the 
companies that other types of directors cannot.   
 
Human and Social Capital  
In 1978, Pfeffer and Salancik discovered that the board is a fundamental mechanism to 
access resources from the external environment. This resource dependence view was defended 
by a meta-analysis that demonstrated that board size (number of links that board with the 
external environment), had a positive correlation with firm performance (Dalton, Daily, 
Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999). These directors’ links are directly related to their cognitive frames, 
experiences, skills, relationships, personal attributes, and other characteristics, more precisely 
with the directors’ human and social capital (Johnson, Schnatterly & Hill, 2013).  
Human capital is defined by a set of skills, experiences, expertise, and knowledge 
acquired by a specific individual (Coleman, 1988). Johnson, Schnatterly & Hill (2013) also 
describe it as the skills and experiences that each director brings to the board of the firm. 
Therefore, human capital is a concept that covers a wide range of possibilities, from experience 
as CEO of a company to the knowledge acquired in a small or large industry, to experience in 
the banking sector or the financial area. For example, a director with previous experience as a 
CEO will bring executive knowledge to the company’s board (Rosenstien, Bruno, Bygrave, & 
Taylor, 1993). While a director who has had experience in a specific industry can influence 
how information is processed and has an impact on the company’s sales (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 
2009). 
Alternatively, social capital refers to the allocation of resources, available through 
relationships and networks, which facilitate actions (Coleman, 1988; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998). The director’s social capital influences the firms’ advice and counsel (Carpenter & 
Westphal, 2001) and also the decision-making process (Oh, Labianca & Chung, 2006). 
Director’s ties to other firms, personal relationships with firm managers, and social standing 
are three possible categories of differentiation of social capital (Johnson, Schnatterly & Hill, 
2013). For example, an external director who has connections to external institutions will have 
a more exceptional facility of managing resource dependence, than an internal director who has 
a much less comprehensive network of contacts. Social position is also an essential factor. A 
director with high status and reputation, such as a former politician, will be a sign of confidence 
and credibility for external stakeholders (Certo, 2003; Johnson, Schnatterly, Bolton, & Tuggle, 
2011). 
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In that sense, we believe that what makes any former politician capable of fulfilling his 
role as a corporate director is the combination of his human and social capital. Although many 
authors separate and differentiate the two concepts, we follow the Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi 
& Cannella (2008) perspective, admitting that the concepts complement each other so that we 
will deal with human and social capital as one only concept. In their study, these authors 
proposed three distinct dimensions of former politician’s human and social capital: depth, 
breadth, and deterioration, in order to understand what makes some directors more attractive to 
firms in need of outside directors for their boards.  
In our study, we will take the three dimensions used by them, not to study what are the 
characteristics that make them more attractive for companies, but rather to understand which 
characteristics those investors value the most. 
 
 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
 
Depth of human and social capital  
Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Cannella (2008) defined the depth of human and social 
capital of each director as the magnitude of its expertise, skills, and social networks. Each 
outside director brings the organization a different set of resources and linkages to the board of 
the company (Kesner, 1988), based on their experience and technical attributes (Baysinger & 
Butler, 1985).  
In this study, in order to quantify and measure the depth of human and social capital of 
each politician appointed, we use the number of years in government service at regional, 
national, and international levels (see Table 1). We decided to establish the number of years as 
a good depth indicator for three main reasons.   
First of all, it reflects the network of contacts that each politician brings to the company. 
It is a critical factor because the largest the politician’s network, the higher the attributes and 
resources brought by them to serve and connect the companies with the external environment. 
Those resources will contribute to reduce the firm’s uncertainty and consequently increase its 
performance (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). For example, as 
it was already mentioned, the government is one of the non-market actors with the most 
considerable influence on the welfare of companies (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Schueler, Rehibein, 
& Cramer, 2002). The strength of its legislative power is crucial for companies’ well-being 
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since it is capable of modifying the market size, establishing entry and exit barriers, providing 
favorable subsidies to companies and changing labor and safety laws and regulations, which 
can result in a massive increase in costs for firms. Under this context, former politicians with 
an extensive network of contacts within the government may be able to acquire privileged 
information or even pressure and manipulate political decision-makers in order to benefit the 
companies (Pfeffer, 1972). Furthermore, it will facilitate access to critical contingents 
controlled by the state, such as tax exemptions and public contracts (Goldman, Rocholl & So, 
2013). 
Second, the number of years as a politician is synonymous with experience and 
knowledge about the public policy legislation process, government decision process, and 
legitimacy (Hillman, Cannella & Paetzold, 2000). So, the higher the number of years of 
experience as a politician, the better will be the advice and counsel service provided to the 
company, based on the valuable knowledge of all the rules and mechanisms of the government 
(Hillman, 2005). This knowledge brings enormous advantages to companies, such as the 
reduction of transaction costs, which otherwise would be impossible or very expensive to obtain 
(Hillman, 2005).  
Finally, Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold (2000) highlighted former politicians as 
influencers of the community, since they can influence non-business organizations. At the same 
time, directors with status, prestige, and a high reputation indirectly become an information 
signal about the organization for external stakeholders (Certo, 2003). In that sense, we can 
admit that the longer the number of years of government service, the higher will be the 
credibility and the exposure of a director, and consequently, a better image of the company will 




The longer a politician has served in government, the higher the perceived value of their 
appointment to the firm is for investors.  
 
Breadth of human and social capital 
 While the depth of the human and social capital is related to the magnitude, the breadth 
refers to the diversity of the expertise, skills, and social networks that each director holds 
(Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Cannella, 2008). To quantify the diversity of human and social 
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capital of each former politician, we decided to use the number of different positions that each 
of them held in the government (for example, mayor, deputy, minister, ambassador). As well 
as the number of years in the government, the number of positions is hugely valued by investors, 
once it can provide valuable business and non-business perspectives (Hillman, 2005).  
First, the higher the number of positions held by each former politician, the more 
extensive the politician’s network with relevant external organizations. As we mentioned 
earlier, the politician’s network will be very relevant for firms, since they will serve as a means 
of cooptation (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), leading to a minimization of companies’ external 
dependence and greater control of vital external resources (Pfeffer, 1972; Provan, 1980). For 
example, a politician who has been a Minister of Justice, Secretary of State for Energy and 
Member of the Parliament, will be much more valuable for an Energy company, than a 
politician who has only been a Member of the Parliament. This politician will have more 
contacts within the Justice Ministry, essential to know information about laws, essential 
resources, and to put pressure on policymakers. He will also have more contacts with 
organizations and firms related to the energy industry, making it easier to obtain critical 
resources and obtain information about the competition and also, with several members of the 
Assembly of the Republic, essential to know if the laws will go to parliament and if they will 
be passed. 
Second, a politician with a higher number of positions held will have more value for 
investors due to the knowledge and experience acquired in a wide range of areas, allowing for 
broader advice and counsel service to companies. In their paper, Hillman, Cannella & Paetzold 
(2000) have differentiated, within the different types of directors, the Support Specialist 
Directors, those who have experiences and linkages in specific areas that are related to the 
company’s strategy. Therefore, the higher the number of positions that a politician has held, the 
higher will be his knowledge in areas that require specific experience and consequently, the 
broader will be the provision of support to the companies. Using the example of the previous 
paragraph, a politician who was Minister of Justice, Secretary of State for Energy and Member 
of Parliament, will have more specific knowledge, in law and energy, than a politician who was 
only a Member of Parliament.  
 Finally, the higher the number of positions held by a former politician, the lower the 
costs that the company will have to bear. If a company needs specialists in law and energy, it 
will be financially better for it to hire a person who is experienced in both, that one experienced 




The greater the number of political positions held by a politician over their career, the higher 
the perceived value of their appointment to the firm is for investors.  
 
Deterioration of human and social capital 
 According to the theory presented by Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Cannella (2008), 
the depth and the breadth of human and social capital of a director, make him more capable of 
providing essential resources and, consequently, improving his performance as a director. 
However, what is typical and expected is that the value of human and social capital will be lost 
over time, once it ceases to regenerate. 
 When someone is part of government service or any other organization, it builds a 
network of official contacts and knowledge over the years of work, and the different positions 
held (Kotter & Heskett, 2011). This network is made up of compelling and essential people, 
and its construction is vital for efficient performance in any government position (Granovetter, 
1973).  
However, when a former politician leaves the government definitively, he ceases to be 
present daily in government functions, and there is no regeneration and updating of his network 
of knowledge and contacts. This deterioration happens because, over time, the influential 
people who were part of his network, ended up leaving the government and being replaced by 
new politicians. This natural process ends up depreciating the human and social capital that 
each government official has accumulated throughout his years of work. Likewise, all the 
knowledge about the internal functioning of the government, acquired by former politicians, 
ends up deteriorating, as new public policies appear and the functions of the government 
changes (Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Cannella, 2008). In this way, it is possible to conclude 
that the human and social capital of each politician is more valuable right after they leave the 
government and that it will deteriorate over time. 
 
Hypothesis #3 
The longer the time interval between leaving government and being appointed to a firm, the 





RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
Data and Sample 
 To study the investor reactions to politicians’ appointments, regarding the depth, breadth 
and deterioration in Portugal, it was necessary to collect information about firms’ board 
composition, the exact date of director appointment, and a background check of each appointed 
director in order to find any political connection. To study this topic, we collected information 
from all the annual reports of the 45 firms present on the EuroNext Lisbon Stock, over the 
period 2010 to 2018. However, only 44 firms were part of the final sample, since only these 
had financial data about the 9 years period necessary to carry out the linear regressions. Within 
these 44 firms and during the defined period, we verified the existence of 334 appointments of 
directors to the companies’ boards. 
  To ascertain which appointed directors had political connections research about the 
professional background was done across all the directors in our sample. The primary research 
sources used were Portuguese news agencies and newspapers such as: Expresso, Público, 
Diário de Notícias and Reuters. Additionally, annual reports were used for bibliographical 
information on the directors.  
In this study we considered former politicians all those who served in different 
government areas (executive and legislative) and jurisdiction scope (regional, national and 
international level), considering the government’s experience and degrees of influence (El 
Nayal, Oosterhout, Essen, 2019). Regarding executive politicians with international jurisdiction 
scope, were considered all the European Union commissioners, foreign politicians and 
ambassadors. At the national level, they were treated as executive politicians, all those who 
were ministers and state secretaries. For executive politicians at the regional level we 
acknowledge only mayors. In the legislative branch at the international level, members of the 
European Parliament, as well as foreign politicians were included. Finally, at the national level, 
all members of parliament were considered, as well as the regional level, where all members of 
regional assemblies were considered. Taking into account all these restrictions that characterize 
a politician, we were left with a sample of 28 directors who corresponded to the indicated 
standards.  
Below is Table 1 which provides a schematic summary of the classification described 






Dependent Variable: CARs 
 To create the dependent variable of this study, we needed to develop an event study of 
all the politicians appointed to the board of directors in our firms’ sample. In an event study, 
scholars analyze the company announcements and changes, such as director appointments to 
the board, mergers or acquisitions between two business entities, that cause an impact on firms’ 
securities, with a magnitude that reflect the estimate of investors on the economic value of this 
event (MacKinlay, 1997). Since it is quite tricky and complex to understand the impact of 
corporate political activity, event studies are widely used by CPA researchers due to their 
clarifying ability to translate reactions to firms’ political activity strategies, into statistical data 
(e.g., Hillman, ZardKoohi, & Bierman, 1999; El Nayal, Oosterhout & Essen, 2019).   
To develop this event study, we had to find out the exact date of the public 
announcement of the appointment of these politicians for the boards of directors. To do that, 
we used mainly in the Portuguese newspapers mentioned above, as well as the announcements 
made by the firms. It is relevant to mention that in cases where there were two appointment 
dates, the oldest one was always considered.    
In order to isolate all these events from other market reactions, observations that 
coincided with mergers and acquisitions, earnings, or dividends announcements or other firms’ 
actions with some magnitude were not selected (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). Additionally, 
were excluded two appointments that occurred in the first year of the firm’s linting on EuroNext 
Lisbon Stock, since to conduct an event study, a previous period of regular exchange activity 
is required (Paruchuri & Misangyi, 2015). By removing these two observations, our sample 
was reduced to 26 director appointments. 
For the CARs calculation, we use the standard market model, correlating the Portugal 
reference index (PSI20) and the stock price of each company during a fixed pre-event 
estimation period of 255 trading days. The event window was based on previous studies (e.g., 
El Nayal, Oosterhout & Essen, 2019) selecting a 3-day window including the day of the event, 











Members of European Parliament 
Foreign Politicians 
Members of the Parliament Members of Regional Assembly 
Table 1 – Definition of Politician 
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the day before, and the day after [–1/+1]. The use of a short window is more advantageous in 
events studies of this type because it reduces the likelihood of contamination effects, while 
simultaneously, it covers leaks of information, as well as the possibility of the announcements 
made out of stock market operation hours (Brown & Warner, 1985). 
 
Analytical Strategy 
 In order to understand the relationship between the human and social capital of former 
politicians, and their perceived value on the boards of directors in Portugal we did a linear 
regression, in which CARs were the dependent variable and the depth, a breadth, and the 
deterioration of human and social capital were the independent variables. 
 
Independent Variables  
Depth of human and social capital. For testing the Hypothesis 1, we measure the depth of 
human and social capital of each politician director through the number of years of government 
service, regardless of the number of different positions held (Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi & 
Cannella, 2008). The data that we used were obtained through the biographies of each 
government official, present in the annual reports of their firms. In the calculation of the service 
duration, it was accounted any time in government service at the regional, national, or 
international levels. In cases where there was some overlap of positions, the years were not 
counted in duplicate. 
 
Breadth of human and social capital. To test hypothesis 2, it was considered the number of 
different political positions that each political director held, in order to measure his breadth of 
human and social capital. To calculate breadth, the number of years that each politician held 
each post was not counted and were taken into account for all positions at regional, national, 
and international levels. All the data collected about the breadth of each politician was obtained 
from the same sources as the depth.  
 
Deterioration of human and social capital. Hypothesis 3 suggests that the human and social 
capital of each former government official deteriorates over time, losing its value (Lester, 
Hillman, Zardkoohi & Cannella, 2008). To measure the deterioration effectiveness of each 
directors’ human and social capital, we define a time interval (in years), from the moment that 
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politicians left the government until the company appointed him. Although the chronological 
age variable could also influence the deterioration, its impact was not taken into account. 
 
Control Variables 
 When studying the effect of independent variables (depth, breadth, and deterioration) 
on a dependent variable (CARs), it is essential to include control variables that could affect 
firms’ return around the appointment date. In that sense, several variables were controlled at 
directors’ and firms’ level. At the directors’ level, it was included the Politician age at the year 
of appointment, since it is one of the parameters of deterioration of human and social capital 
(Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi & Cannella, 2008); the Right-wing Politician, a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if it is a right-wing politician and 0 if is not a right-wing politician, because right-
wing politicians are less in favor of state intervention in the economy and are more pro-business 
(Dunlap, Xiao, and McCright, 2001; Neumayer, 2003); the International politician, where 1 
means international and 0 national, because as we are studying the Portuguese stock market it 
is normal for firms to be interested in politicians who recently operate in the national territory, 
once they have much more comprehensive knowledge about all the internal procedures and 
bureaucracies, and also because their network of contacts will be much more focused on 
Portuguese institutions; lastly we chose to put the Executive politician as a control variable a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if it is an executive politician and 0 if is a legislative politician 
because we believe that executive politicians (Ministers and Secretaries of State), although 
supervised by the Assembly of the Republic, have a greater power of manipulation and control 
over the applied laws and norms.  
Once company variables can also affect cumulative abnormal returns, we included some 
firm control variables such as Firm Size, Total Board Size, Firm Leverage, and Firm 
Performance. State Ownership was not considered as a control variable since none of the firms 
included has a percentage held by the state. Companies with a larger scale and who may be 
better positioned in the market in which they operate, have a more significant number of means 
and a more excellent facility in managing external dependency, making the value of any 
political strategy challenging to identify in CARs (El Nayal, Oosterhout & Essen, 2019). For 
this reason, we decided to include Firm Size as a control variable, measured as the natural log 
of total assets. The Total Board Size was also used as a control variable because of the effect of 
an additional director’s appointment on the firm, maybe much more abundant in smaller boards 
(Hillman, Wither & Collins, 2009). Firm Leverage was calculated through the Debt-to-Equity 
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ratio and expressed the shareholders’ equity capacity to cover all outstanding debt in case of a 
crisis. Finally, the Firm Performance was also considered as a control variable, measured 
through the ROE (Net income/Equity).  
 After considering all these control variables, at directors and firm level, two 
observations were dropped from our sample, as a result of missing information. Therefore, the 





































































 Model 0  Model 1  Model 2   Model 3  Model 4  
           
Political experience in years (H1)   0,000      0,001  
  p=0,771      p=0,227  
  (0,001)      (0,001)   
          
Number of political positions 
(H2) 
    -0,002    -0,009  
    p=0,502    p=0,086 * 
    (0,003)    (0,005)   
          
Politician’s deterioration (H3)       -0,001  -0,001  
      p=0,388  p=0,472  
      (0,001)  (0,001)   
          
Politician’s age  0,000  0,000  0,000  0,000  0,001  
p=0,935  p=0,993  p=0,654  p=0,550  p=0,185  
(0,001)  (0,001)  (0,001)  (0,001)  (0,001)   
          
Right-wing politician  0,016  0,016  0,015  0,017  0,009  
p=0,088 * p=0,103  p=0,132  p=0,076  p=0,412  
(0,009)  (0,009)  (0,009)  (0,009)  (0,010)   
          
International politician -0,006  -0,006  -0,007  -0,015  -0,022  
p=0,565  p=0,568  p=0,504  p=0,314  p=0,172  
(0,010)  (0,010)  (0,010)  (0,014)  (0,015)   
          
Executive politician -0,007  -0,007  -0,006  -0,004  0,000  
p=0,435  p=0,456  p=0,489  p=0,620  p=0,961  
(0,008)  (0,009)  (0,009)  (0,009)  (0,009)   
          
Board size -0,003  -0,003  -0,003  -0,002  -0,003  
p=0,001 *** p=0,042 ** p=0,032 ** p=0,062 ** p=0,029 ** 
(0,034)  (0,004)  (0,001)  (0,001)  (0,001)   
          
Firm size 0,005  0,009  0,005  0,006  0,007  
p=0,205  p=0,698  p=0,214  p=0,176  p=0,082 * 
(0,004)  (0,023)  (0,004)  (0,004)  (0,004)   
          
Firm leverage  0,011  0,011  0,012  0,010  0,008  
p=0,625  p=0,656  p=0,607  p=0,681  p=0,710  
(0,023)  (0,024)  (0,023)  (0,023)  (0,022)   
          
Firm performance -0,017  -0,017  -0,015  0,000  0,007  
p=0,038 * p=0,677  p=0,707  p=0,994  p=0,881  
(0,671)  (0,039)  (0,039)  (0,042)  (0,043)  
Table 3 
Linear Regression Results Using CARs as the Dependent Variable  
 
Note: N = 24 at the event level. CARs (cumulative abnormal returns) calculated over a 3-day event window -1, 0, +1. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
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RESULTS 
 First of all, it is essential to mention that the average CARs generated by politician 
appointments are positive (1.03%) and statistically significant (p = .023). These results are 
interpreted as evidence that, in Portugal, the appointments of former politicians to company 
boards are positively perceived by investors.  
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the linear regression 
analysis. It reports the means, standard deviation, and the correlations between the different 
variables. It is also possible to see that the correlation between Political experience in years and 
Number of political positions has a really high value and significance (r = 0.799, p = 0.007). 
These values suggest that the variables can be too similar between them, which could represent 
a major problem for this study. In order to solve it, multicollinearity was checked by conducting 
a variance inflation factor test after running an OLS regression with the full range of variables. 
The maximum value was 6.306, which is under the recommended maximum value of 10, 
suggesting that multicollinearity is not an issue (Meyers, Gamst, & Guarino, 2017).  
 
Main Results 
Table 3 provides the linear regression results using CARs as the dependent variable. 
Hypothesis 1, which predicts a positive relationship between the directors’ political experience 
in years and investor reactions to politicians’ appointments, does not receive support. Although 
in Model 1 and 4, the coefficient for political experience in years is positive, it is still statistically 
insignificant. On the other hand, the coefficient for the number of political positions is negative 
and marginally significant in Model 4 (β = - 0.009, p = 0.086). These results not just 
demonstrate that hypothesis 2 is not supported, but it also suggests that there exists a negative 
relationship between the number of political positions that each politician held and the investor 
reactions to their appointment.  Hypothesis 3, which predicts that the longer the period between 
leaving the government and being appointed to the board of directors of a company, the higher 
the deterioration of human and social capital, is not supported. The coefficient for politician’s 




Nowadays, the appointment of former politicians for the firm’s board of directors is a 
strategy used worldwide. Social science scholars have not yet been able to determine with 
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certainty whether these appointments have effectively contributed to the increase, decrease, or 
have had no impact on the value of companies. Mainly it is fundamental to study which are the 
conditions and factors that make politicians suitable for each company. In this study, we start 
from the premise that political connections can be positive by bringing benefits to the firms. 
We also believe that one of the main factors that most differentiates politicians, among them, 
making some better than others as directors, is their human and social capital. 
In this study, we use the perspective of investors, to understand the value that each 
politician can provide to the company-the value of politicians as resource providers. Since we 
believe that these characteristics are directly linked with the human and social capital of each 
director, we study the depth, breadth, and deterioration of human and social capital of each 
former politician appointed. We used a sample of 24 former politicians, from 44 EuroNext 
Lisbon Stock companies, over 8 years (2010-2018). 
Within this topic, we discovered that in Portugal, the appointment of former politicians 
to company boards is seen by the investors as something beneficial and as an added value for 
firms. Our findings are in line with prior studies documenting the positive value of politician 
appointments in other countries, presumably owing to these directors’ access to political 
resources (e.g. Hillman, 2005). We also note that prior studies have found that the level of 
perception of corruption in a country condition the expected value of politician appointments 
(El Nayal, Oosterhout & Essen, 2019). In that regard, perceived corruption in Portugal may be 
a driver behind these positive findings. Although in 2019, in the corruption perception index 
(CPI), Portugal obtained 62 points on a scale of 0 to 100, occupying the 30th position among 
180 countries, it is below the Western European average (66 points) and the average of the 
European Union (64 points) (Transparency International Portugal, 2019). This position 
suggests that the level of perceived corruption is still high, according to the European standards, 
and for this reason, investors could consider political appointments to Portuguese firms to be 
particularly effective solutions for managing regulatory and governmental dependencies.  
Regarding the human and social capital, we discover that contrary to what we thought 
initially in hypothesis 2, investors react negatively to the appointment of politicians with a vast 
breadth. This result means that investors do not appreciate the variety of positions and the 
human and social capital gained through them. In our analysis, there are three different 
explanations for this phenomenon, which can coincide. The first explanation is that investors 
value more specialists in one area than generalists in several areas, which may sometimes not 
be as deep. In this way, politicians with a great depth of experience in the same position will be 
more valued since this may reflect more excellent knowledge and, consequently, better advice 
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and counsel service for the company. The second explanation is the fact that they are changing 
positions frequently. These changes can mean that they are mainly concerned with their well-
being and personal gains, conveying the idea that the interests of corporate shareholders will be 
put on the back burner. The last explanation has to do, again, with the corruption perception 
index. Even though Portugal is below the European average in the CPI, there was an apparent 
decrease in the perception of corruption levels between 2010 and 2018. This decrease may mean 
that although appointing politicians is still seen as a solution in terms of regulation and the 
provision of resources for the company, corruption is becoming less and less tolerated and 
normalized by the control bodies, the media, and public opinion in general. For these reasons, 
politicians with a higher breadth will be more notorious, leading to greater public scrutiny and 
attention from society and the media, making it more difficult, according to RDT, to provide 
resources for companies.  
 Regarding the deterioration of human and social capital, the results obtained in this 
study, although pointing to its confirmation, were not significant. Even so, we found that 50% 
of the sample was hired in the period between 0 and 3 years after leaving the government, 
16.67% between 4 and 7 years, and the remaining 29.13% after 8 or more years. These results 
are very similar to those obtained by Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Cannella (2008) in their 
work. Besides, of the 50% who were hired between the period of 0 to 3 years, 66.67% were 
hired for companies in the energy industry, and the banking sector, areas with high levels of 
regulation (Grier, Munger, & Roberts, 1994). On one hand, after 2 years, human and social 
capital related to the provision of resources begins to deteriorate dramatically (Lester, Hillman, 
Zardkoohi, & Cannella, 2008), and from there, we observed a large percentage of hires between 
the 0 and the 3 years. Even so, there are still hires, albeit less frequently, after these 3 years, 
which may be evidence that there is an appreciation of human and social capital related to 
governance functions in some politicians. 
 Finally, regarding the human and social capital depth, tested in hypothesis 1, although 
the results obtained were positive, they were not significant in either Model 1 or Model 4.  We 
believe that these results may not have been significant due to the small size of our sample. 
However, it may be possible that the investors consider that the number of years of experience 
is not fundamental for the provision of more and better resources to the company. Therefore, 
investors may consider that the fact of having held a political position or not is the only factor 
that differentiates a better provision of resources. 
Due to all these reasons, we can conclude that this work had several essential 
contributions. First, it differs from most other traditional CPA studies, as it does not just 
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contribute to the classic debate of demonstrating whether politicians increase, decrease, or add 
no value to firms. In addition to this contribution, we also intended to understand whether 
human and social capital is an important factor in the attribution of value, not treating all 
politicians as a homogeneous variable, but rather heterogeneously, differentiating their depth, 
breadth and deterioration. 
Secondly, this study relates to the perspective of investors with human and social capital, 
something that had never been done before. In this way, we can see that human social and 
capital, more precisely, the years of experience, the number of positions held, and the 
deterioration, have an impact on the perception of investors and that there are specific 
characteristics of the directors that are more valid than others. Although it is an investor 
perspective, it can be used as a starting point to help realize that former politicians can bring 
more benefits to companies. 
Finally, this study also contributed with some new knowledge to the area of CPA and 
politicians on the board of directors with Portugal’s example since it had never been studied 
before. Although it is impossible to generalize its results to the other countries of the European 
Union, due to its different size and economic situation, the coverage of a more significant 
number of countries may facilitate the study of these areas in the future. 
 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
Like all other empirical studies, this dissertation has some limitations that may be taken 
into account for future research. Firstly, the sample of this research is a little reduced, and it 
may have conditioned the results and their proof. We believe that if the sample was bigger, the 
results would be more significant, and could have a more exceptional contribution to this 
research. Secondly, this study was carried out only in Portugal, making a generalization 
common to other countries impossible, not only due to cultural factors but also legislative ones. 
It would be essential to broaden the range of countries analyzed in order to understand whether 
these results are typical in other countries. Thirdly, although the characteristics of social and 
human capital are used, it is difficult for our results to record precisely the benefits that each 
director represents since the results spread investors’ reflections, based only on their 
perceptions of value. Fourthly, it is also important to realize that the appointment of politicians 
to firm boards is not the only political strategy used by companies. Since the appointments are 
quite visible, there may be more hidden strategies that are not noticeable and make study in this 
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area impossible. Fifthly, the deterioration of human and social capital, could have been 
measured in weeks or days, giving us a set of more specific results that could have influenced 
the final linear regression. Finally, in this study, only companies listed on the EuroNext Lisbon 
Stock exchange were analyzed in order to be able to carry out the event study. However, we 
understand that it is necessary to take into account that private firms and non-profit 
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